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Abstract 
This paper seeks to provide a systematized framework for the 
main ideas that have been developed by ECLAC concerning the effects 
that market-led reforms have had on labour, financial and technology 
markets. In order to explore these questions further, a research project 
has been undertaken by ECLAC with the sponsorship of the German 
Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). The project deals with the 
institutional requirements for properly functioning financial, 
technology and labour markets. Particular attention is being devoted to 
the institutional forces affecting market access by traditionally 
excluded actors, such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
in the case of long-term financial and technology markets, poor 
households in the case of housing finance, and female workers in the 
case of the labour market.  
As a consequence of the market-led reforms, Latin America has 
transformed its pattern of development and the way in which its brand 
of capitalism is configured. At the same time, the reform process is 
shown to have yielded unsatisfactory results when the performance 
level achieved in each factor market is evaluated. Labour markets 
exhibit a range of difficulties in reducing unemployment and informal 
employment. Financial markets are characterized by concentration and 
by the increasing difficulties encountered by the weaker agents in 
accessing resources. And, in most of the economies in the region, the 
role played by technology markets in creating and diffusing 
technology domestically is being downgraded. This poor performance 
has co-evolved along with a reduction in the State’s participation in the 
economy and an increasing power asymmetry in favour of private 
agents.  
Institutional  requirements for market-led development in Latin America 
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The above difficulties seem to be related to the persistence of various types of market failures 
and the lack of non-market institutions capable of strengthening and supporting the operation of 
factor markets. The persistence of imperfect information, the lack of initial entitlements and gaps in 
learning capabilities have hindered the adaptation of various actors to the discipline of a new macro 
policy and incentive regime. Because of these underlying weaknesses in the institutional fabric 
inherited by the region, its factor markets have functioned very imperfectly and have failed to 
deliver what was expected of them in terms of a better long-term overall performance. 
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Introduction 
Many Latin American countries made significant changes in 
their macroeconomic policies and regulatory regimes during the 1980s. 
Trade and financial liberalization, the de-regulation of markets and the 
privatization of economic activities were carried out as part of such 
programmes. These changes –which can be synthetically described as 
the transition from State-led industrialization (SLI) to a more outward-
oriented, market-led regime– were strongly influenced by the belief 
that the political economy of the Latin American countries must be 
transformed if they are to enhance their long-term growth performance 
while simultaneously attaining significant welfare improvements.  
Have these reforms been successful? On the one hand, given the 
overlapping effects that these reforms have had on macroeconomic 
management and on microeconomic aspects of labour, financial and 
technology markets, evaluating their impact is by no means an easy 
task. On the other hand, many of these structural changes are still in 
the process of being implemented and/or “digested”, so their ultimate 
outcomes are not yet clear (Stallings and Peres, 2000; ECLAC, 2000 
and 2002; Katz, 2000a).  
Although no definitive assessment has yet been made, a feeling 
of frustration with the results of these reforms seems to be spreading 
among both policy makers and academics throughout the region. Many 
experts are beginning to express the view that expectations regarding 
the likely benefits of these reforms may have been grossly 
overoptimistic. It is becoming clear that, while correcting  
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macroeconomic fundamentals may be a necessary step, it is not a sufficient condition for the 
transition towards a new equilibrium growth path (ECLAC, 2000 and 2002). 
This paper constitutes an attempt to identify and examine possible causes of this poor 
performance, together with the institutional changes that appear to be required in order to overcome 
them. The emphasis of this analysis is on the institutional setting of the political economy that now 
predominates in Latin America as a consequence of these reforms. The region’s political economy 
has been strongly influenced by the normative implications of the conventional view of how 
markets work. By locating the market at the centre of the analysis, this school of thought predicts 
that Latin American economies can attain an efficient behavioural pattern.  
As a consequence of the above, Latin America has transformed its pattern of development 
and the way in which its brand of capitalism is configured. At the same time, the reform process is 
shown to have yielded unsatisfactory results when the performance level achieved in each factor 
market is evaluated. Labour markets exhibit a range of difficulties in reducing unemployment and 
informal employment. Financial markets are characterized by concentration and by the increasing 
difficulties encountered by the weaker agents in accessing resources. And, in most of the economies 
in the region, the role played by technology markets in creating and diffusing technology 
domestically is being downgraded (ECLAC, 1999, 2002). This poor performance has co-evolved 
along with a reduction in the State’s participation in the economy and an increasing power 
asymmetry in favour of private agents. Thus, the increasing accumulation in key sectors (such as 
public services and exporting sectors), which has been encouraged by the State, has ended up 
reducing the State’s ability to implement new policies.  
More and more experts are voicing the view that other institutional and regulatory forces may 
be necessary to improve long-term growth and welfare results. In particular, the above difficulties 
seem to be related to the lack of non-market institutions capable of strengthening and supporting the 
operation of factor markets. The persistence of imperfect information, the lack of initial entitlements 
and gaps in technological capabilities have hindered the adaptation of various actors to the 
discipline of a new macro policy and incentive regime. Because of these underlying weaknesses in 
the production and institutional fabric inherited by the region, its factor markets have functioned 
very imperfectly and have failed to deliver what was expected of them in terms of a better long-term 
overall performance.  
This paper seeks to provide a systematized framework for the main ideas that have been 
developed by ECLAC concerning the effects that market-led reforms have had on labour, financial 
and technology markets. In order to explore these questions further, a research project has been 
undertaken by ECLAC with the sponsorship of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ). The project deals with the institutional requirements for properly functioning financial, 
technology and labour markets. Particular attention is being devoted to the institutional forces 
affecting market access by traditionally excluded actors, such as small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in the case of long-term financial and technology markets, poor households in 
the case of housing finance, and female workers in the case of the labour market.  
The present paper reports on the results of these studies. Section 2 examines the theoretical 
framework upon which the research has been founded. It is argued that conventional neoclassical 
tools are highly unsuitable for this research effort because they provide a very poor representation 
of what institutions are actually like and what role they play as determinants of social performance. 
Sections 3, 4 and 5 examine how the reforms have affected these settings and, based on a number of 
case studies, analyse the performance of the relevant labour, financial and technology markets. 
Section 6 describes some of the requirements for the incorporation of non-market institutions and 
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the complementarity between them and market-led reforms. Section 7 summarizes the findings and 
presents conclusions. 
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I. Analytical background  
of the reforms 
The direction of the first-generation reforms was strongly 
influenced by a conventional view as to how markets function –one 
which, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to as the “equilibrium-
welfare view of the roles that institutions and organizations play in 
society. This approach leads to important policy conclusions, and both 
it and those conclusions will be discussed in the following subsection. 
(a) Market efficiency 
In the tradition of the equilibrium-welfare approach, markets 
and competition are built entirely on the idea of the logical consistency 
between market environment, preference functions and adjusting 
variables (prices and quantities). The market is generally defined as the 
loci where perfectly informed and rational utility-maximizing agents 
meet in order to carry out transactions. This characterization plays a 
central role in resource allocation and in the selection of efficient 
market outcomes. Prices and factors are completely flexible and 
information is widely distributed.  
Structural reforms were undertaken in Latin America under the 
expectation that a fully competitive economy would reach equilibrium 
at a Pareto-optimal level, a situation where all economic agents are 
rewarded according to their marginal productivity and no agent can, 
through further trade, be better off without reducing others’ welfare. 
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This is a very appealing and politically attractive conceptual basis upon which to operate, 
since it implies that any other institutional setting outside that of a fully competitive economy (full 
flexibility of prices and factors, and no “noise” created by government intervention in the economy) 
will lead to a general equilibrium that is below Pareto optimality. In such a view, State intervention 
in resource allocation or institutional features that lead to less price and factor flexibility will 
produce a misallocation of resources and hinder the achievement of a sustainable long-term 
equilibrium. Thus, the reforms were guided by the need for market “flexibility” and less 
government intervention.  
The above approach is deeply described in market friendly strategies for development (World 
Bank, 1991).1 In the case of the labour market, exclusion was seen as being due to a lack of 
institutional flexibility (to hire and fire workers) and an insistence upon industrial policies that did 
not generate a significant demand for the large unskilled segment of the labour force. A similar 
argument was applied in the case of financial markets, and financial market regulation was therefore 
regarded as the reason why financing was unavailable for many activities and actors in the 
economy. Finally, the insistence on the development of domestic technological capabilities through 
active public R&D efforts –involving the financing and/or production of knowledge and technology 
in public laboratories and research institutes– led to unnecessary expenditures which could have 
been avoided by leaving firms to acquire ready-made technology in foreign markets.  
For our purposes here, it is sufficient to note that the prevailing belief was that once the 
government “got out of the way,” private markets would allocate resources better, thus generating 
faster growth and expanding access opportunities. In other words, the accessibility issue was 
considered to be a direct consequence of an efficient market resource allocation process.  
In the following section it will be shown that these expectations were not fulfilled in any of 
the three markets under consideration. First, however, a brief analysis of the overall policy 
conclusions implicit in the conventional view may be in order. 
(b) Market-led reforms 
The pattern of development seen in Latin America prior to the structural reforms of the 1980s 
and 1990s was shaped by the SLI strategy adopted in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
Mixed economy have prevailed in the region, with an important role of non-market institutions as 
leading actors in the coordination of different markets and agents. 
In the labour market, this strategy was closely related to the role played by the State as an 
“engine” of growth that induced the expansion of manufacturing output and the gradual 
development of a skilled labour force capable of supporting that expansion. Public-sector 
educational organizations (such as vocational schools) were created in order to train the workforce 
required by the production structure. A complex framework of legal codes and judicial procedures 
was gradually formed that governed such matters as dismissals, labour relations and so forth. 
Public development banks such as Nafinsa in Mexico, BNDE in Brazil and BND in 
Argentina took the lead in providing long-term finance for public-sector involvement in the 
production of goods and services. Public institutions and organizations were created and/or 
strengthened with a view to implementing the SLI strategy. Policies were highly sector-specific and 
selective, and they paid very little attention to markets or the discipline of competition. 
                                                     
1  These market led reforms –at a more microeconomic level- have been articulated with the implementation of the following 
macroeconomic recommendations: fiscal discipline, tax reform, market-determined interest rates, competitive exchange rates, liberal 
trade policies, openness to foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, respect for property rights and more public 
expenditure on education and health care, these recommendation are described in the Washington Consensus, (Williamson 1990). 
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Finally, in the field of technology, public R&D labs and State universities, together with 
public development banks that furnished long-term finance for major undertakings in fields such as 
energy, telecommunications and transport services, have played an important role the 
industrialization process. Public firms engaged in these kinds of activities developed their own 
engineering departments and R&D facilities in order to supply themselves with the technology they 
needed for these ventures. As a complementary measure, public policies designed to attract foreign 
direct investment to manufacturing activities helped to obtain the required know-how in many 
technology-intensive sectors of the economy, such as the pharmaceuticals and automotive 
industries.  
Within an economic climate marked by a lack of competitive discipline and difficulties in 
achieving macroeconomic stability, policy makers adopted the new policy package promoted by the 
Washington Consensus and market friendly strategies for development. Policies were designed and 
implemented at two different levels. At a macroeconomic level, the reforms were mainly designed 
to lower barriers to financial and commercial flows (external financial and trade liberalization), 
reduce government intervention (privatization of public enterprises) and maintain economic 
fundamentals (mainly through fiscal discipline). At the microeconomic level, the reforms were 
aimed at augmenting price flexibility (by reducing government’s role in supplying public goods), 
factor flexibility (by allowing more flexible contracts, in such areas as employment) and increasing 
the role of private institutions in allocating resources (through financial- and labour-market 
deregulation). It was assumed that after a short period of time, during which inefficient enterprises 
would disappear, resources would be redeployed to more efficient and internationally competitive 
firms and sectors.  
In order to assess the impact of these policies on each of the three factor markets to be 
considered here, the first step is to determine what the prevailing situation was like in each one, 
what the reforms were designed to attain and, finally, what the reforms’ results were. These 
questions will be examined in the next three sections. 
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II. The labour market 
During the period of SLI, the institutional setting for labour 
markets in Latin America was oriented towards the construction of a 
legal and training infrastructure that in many respects reproduced the 
main features of the prevailing institutions and organizations in 
developed countries: “The aim was to create a framework of social 
integration that responded to the sharp growth of employment in the 
industrial and tertiary sectors, and that could also satisfy the demands 
of emerging social strata…Thus, as had happened in the industrialized 
countries, the region’s labour market institutions sought to regulate 
labour relations through direct State intervention and collective 
agreements between workers and employers… The two main 
components of the regime developed in industrialized countries were 
labour legislation and collective bargaining. In the context of a broad 
national pact (tacit or explicit) between firms, workers and the public 
sector, these dispositions (which included increasing real wages; 
decreasing working hours; protection against unemployment, illness 
and disability; and regulations on safety and hygiene at work) 
improved working conditions and helped increase labour productivity 
(through training and work organization)" (Weller, 2000a: 189). 
A general consequence of this view was that the labour market 
was mainly regulated and coordinated by the State. This was reflected 
in aspects such as: centrally-set wages (which were usually indexed to 
past inflation), a high degree of job security stemming from the 
considerable cost of laying off workers, and restrictions on the use of 
temporary contracts, as well as the significant bargaining power 
wielded by trade unions. 
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Even by the end of this period, however, the labour market differed significantly from labour 
markets in developed economies: (i) the institutional framework was limited to a fraction of the 
workforce, which varied according to the level of development of the economies in the region; (ii) 
in several economies of the region and in some periods, relations among the State, entrepreneurs 
and workers were strongly influenced by populist policies; on the other hand, in other periods, 
social and political instability generated cycles in which established rights and obligations were 
often disregarded under authoritarian regimes. 
It was believed that economic reforms would succeed in eliminating distortions in most 
markets and would therefore increase the demand for labour. The labour market was viewed as 
being no exception, and reformers assumed that the replacement of generally rigid systems in which 
the State regularly intervened in labour relations with a more flexible structure would generate a 
bias towards increasing the competitiveness of firms more than towards protecting job stability for 
workers. Labour reform would, in turn, do away with the countless distortions existing in the labour 
market, which served only to increase the cost of labour owing to the cost of laying off workers, the 
power of the unions, the existence of minimum wages, etc. In other words, even if only through the 
price effect, demand for labour ought to grow. 
It should also be noted that these labour-market reforms amounted to more than simply a 
“deregulation” of that market. The reforms were carried out under two major assumptions.  
The first was that they would bring particular benefits to the large sectors producing tradable 
goods, namely, agriculture and manufacturing. In agriculture, the elimination of existing distortions 
would improve the sector’s relative prices. This would stimulate agricultural production because of 
the region’s comparative advantages in this sphere, the result of abundant manpower and favourable 
natural conditions (World Bank, 1986). This expansion of agricultural production, a consequence of 
the elimination of the urban bias, would have a significant positive net impact on employment 
because of the high labour intensity of the sector as a whole (World Bank, 1990a).  
The second was that these economies were intensive in unskilled labour. As Anne Krueger has 
argued, “Insofar as developing countries are relatively abundantly endowed with unskilled labour and 
relatively short of capital, trade with other LDCs is likely to increase the imbalance in factor 
availability, whereas trade with the developed countries may serve as a means of exchanging abundant 
factors for scarce ones” (Krueger, 1978). In this respect, trade liberalization would strengthen the 
region’s comparative advantages by allocating resources for these production activities and would thus 
boost demand for unskilled labour, narrow the wage gap and reduce the anti-export bias of the import 
substitution era, during which the labour factor had been underused. Anne Krueger has also stated, 
“What is already clear is that the findings of the country studies support the view that altering trade 
strategies toward greater export orientation will certainly be consistent with the objective of finding 
more employment opportunities: scepticism based on Lentief Paradox or factor-market distortion 
considerations does not seem to be warranted” (Krueger, 1978).  
(a) The overall result of the reforms 
According to ECLAC (2001) the population active economically expanded by 2,6% in the 
1990s, while employment rate increased only by 2,2 % (see table 1). Thus, the unemployment rate 
rose from 4,6% to 8,6% (that means an increase from 7,6 million of people to 18.1 million)2. This 
result is clearly a disappointing one. In fact, “the number of jobs generated was smaller than the 
increase in the labour force and, despite the increase in productivity and in real wages, income 
                                                     
2  Other studies also confirm this fact, as for example OIT (1999) shows that between 1990-1998, the labor force increased in 3,1% while 
the employment rate grew by 2.5%. As result, the unemployment rate increased from 5,4% to 9,1%. 
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distribution was worse or no different from the decade before”(León, 2001). In order to explain why 
this situation arose, it is useful to view the labour market as being made up of three basic 
components: supply, demand and institutional setting.  
 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: COMPOSITION OF THE WORKING-AGE POPULATION BY SEX a/ 
Description National total (thousands)  Annual 
Average rate 
 1990 1994 1997 1999 1990 - 1999 
Working-age population 274.619 302.852 324.685 339.680 2,4 
Males 134.901 148.463 159.031 166.320 2,4 
Females 139.718 154.389 165.655 173.360 2,4 
      
Economically active population 167.485 186.446 201.417 211.833 2,6 
Males 114.479 125.101 133.336 138.995 2,2 
Females 53.005 61.345 68.081 72.838 3,6 
      
Employed persons 159.841 175.632 187.824 193.714 2,2 
Males 109.537 118.678 125.669 129.006 1,8 
Females 50.304 56.954 62.155 64.708 2,8 
      
Unemployed persons 7.643 10.814 13.593 18.118 10,1 
Males 4.942 6.423 7.667 9.989 8,1 
Females 2.701 4.391 5.926 8.129 13,0 
      
Description National total (percentages)   
 1990 1994 1997 1999  
Participation rate b/ 61,0 61,6 62,0 62,4  
Males 84,9 84,3 83,8 83,6  
Females 37,9 39,7 41,1 42,0  
      
Employment rate c/ 58,2 58,0 57,8 57,0  
Males 81,2 79,9 79,0 77,6  
Females 36,0 36,9 37,5 37,3  
      
Unemployment rate 4,6 5,8 6,7 8,6  
Males 4,3 5,1 5,7 7,2  
Females 5,1 7,2 8,7 11,2  
Source: Social Panorama of Latin America 2000-2001, ECLAC (2001), Table III.2. 
a/ Aged 15 years and over. b/ Ratio of the economically active population to the working-age population. c/ Ratio 
of the employed population to the working-age population. 
 
The factor of labour supply did not help to reduce unemployment because the slowdown in 
the growth rate of the working-age population was offset by a sharp increase in the labour force 
participation rate, which was largely attributable to the expansion of the female labour force. Upon 
further analysis, three major aspects are found to have affected the composition of labour supply: 
(i) Over the last two decades the growth rate of the working-age population has declined from 
2.7% (1980-1985) to 2.2% (1995-2000). As a result, the average age of the labour force has trended 
upward, together with its members’ levels of work experience, and the pressure exerted by the 
supply of unskilled labour has eased (Weller 2000a pp. 25) 
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(ii) The labour force’s level of education has also risen, reflecting higher enrolment rates in 
secondary and tertiary education. This tends to keep the labour force participation rate in check and 
allows the educational requirements of labour demand to be met more effectively. 
(iii) Although these demographic trends have a contractionary effect on labour supply, this 
has been more than offset by the increase in labour force participation from 61% in 1990 to 62.4% 
in 1999. This increase can be explicated for the increase in the woman’s participation rate, from 
37.9% to 42%3. 
One of the most powerful effects on the demand side was the decline in the economic growth 
rate. As shown in table 2, growth in the 1990s was lower than the average for the period as a whole. 
This, in turn, affected the growth of employment, which in the 1990s was also below the average 
for the period 1950-1999. The employment elasticity of output in the 1990s does not differ greatly 
from the average for the period from the 1950s to the 1990s. This indicates that the new technology 
introduced to transform the production apparatus during the post-reform period did not absorb more 
labour.  
 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ANNUAL GROWTH IN OUTPUT AND 
EMPLOYMENT, AND THE EMPLOYMENT ELASTICITY OF OUTPUT (1980-1990) 
Period Economic 
growth 
Employment 
growth 
Employment 
elasticity of 
output 
1950s 
1960s 
1970s 
1980s 
1990sa/ 
1950s to 1990s 
5.1 
5.7 
5.6 
1.2 
3.8 
4.3 
1.9 
2.3 
3.8 
2.9 
2.2 
2.7 
0.4 
0.4 
0.7 
2.6 
0.6 
0.6 
Source: Jürgen Weller, “Employment trends in Latin America and the Caribbean during the 
1990s”, CEPAL Review, No. 72 (LC/G.2120-P), Santiago, Chile, December 2000, p. 34.  
a/ 1990-1997 
Moreover, in the 1990s, the creation of new jobs was marked strongly by the informality, 
whereas close to 7 of each 10 new jobs has been created in the informal sector (close to 68,5%). 
Those, have been characterized by the low productivity and the insufficient laboral conditions as 
instability and social security lack (see table 3). Also, we can see that the activities which increased 
the share in the employment was construction, transport and telecommunications, commerce, 
finance and domestic services, while the industry and agricultural sectors decreased their 
participation. 
In the same way, employment was mainly generated in non-tradable and low-productivity 
areas of the economy4, which would not be expected to benefit from technological change until 
after sectors that are more closely linked to international trade had done so. This suggests that the 
impact of technological change on the capital-labour ratio was detrimental to employment, with the 
least productive sectors absorbing the labour laid off from tradable sectors. This empirical evidence 
contradicts the neoclassical predictions: not only was growth slow, but new technology in the 
tradable sector failed to generate employment or absorb labour intensively. 
 
                                                     
3  For more information see ECLAC (2001); Weller, J. (2000a); León, F. (2001).  
4  For more information see Weller (1998, 2000b), ECLAC(2000) and Stallings, Weller (2001). 
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Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMPLOYED POPULATION a/ 
Description Persons (thousands) Percentage breakdown 
 1990 1994 1997 1999 1990 1994 1997 1999 
Branch of activity 159.841 175.632 187.824 193.714 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Agriculture 37.227 39.540 39.424 39.789 23,3 22,5 21,0 20,5 
Industry 26.911 28.738 29.564 29.065 16,8 16,4 15,7 15,0 
Construction 9.499 12.119 12.057 12.284 5,9 6,9 6,4 6,3 
Transport and 
communications 
7.159 8.129 9.337 9.839 4,5 4,6 5,0 5,1 
Commerce 27.747 31.211 34.824 36.968 17,4 17,8 18,5 19,1 
Finance 4.581 7.359 8.273 8.932 2,9 4,2 4,4 4,6 
Social services 30.325 31.042 35.084 36.695 19,0 17,7 18,7 18,9 
Personal services 8.131 8.546 9.572 9.960 5,1 4,9 5,1 5,1 
Domestic service 7.886 8.552 9.273 9.754 4,9 4,9 4,9 5,0 
Unknown 374 395 418 429 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 
         
Employed persons 
in urban areas b/ 
107.581 120.886 130.996 136.626 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Formal sector 61.318 65.668 68.810 70.462 57,0 54,3 52,5 51,6 
Informal sector 46.264 55.218 62.185 66.164 43,0 45,7 47,5 48,4 
         
Absorption of new Thousands   Percentage   
 jobs 90 - 94 94 - 97 97- 99 90 - 99 90 - 94 94 - 97 97- 99 90 - 99 
Total of new jobs 13.305 10.110 5.630 29.045 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Formal sector 4.350 3.142 1.652 9.144 32,7 31,1 29,3 31,5 
Informal sector 8.954 6.967 3.979 19.900 67,3 68,9 70,7 68,5 
Source: ECLAC (2001), Social Panorama of Latin America 2000-2001. 
a/ Aged 15 years and over. b/ Informal or low productivity employment includes persons working in microenterprises 
(establishments of up five persons), domestic service workers, unskilled own-account workers and unpaid family 
workers. 
 
In general, it is recognized that the labour market has become somewhat more flexible. 
According to Tokman and Martínez (1999), greater flexibility has been achieved through cost 
reductions made possible the practice of hiring new workers and giving them temporary contracts or 
no contracts at all (since temporary contracts cost just 42% of what permanent contracts do, and the 
cost of employing workers without contracts is less than half of the cost of permanent contracts). “This 
practice reduced the cost of labour by 5% and the combination of contract types on which it is based 
did not vary between 1990 and 1998” (León, 2001). In order to increase their competitiveness, firms 
raised productivity by laying off workers; labour costs were also reduced by devaluations. 
With regard to the third component of the labour market, its institutional setting, problems of 
access for excluded sectors and diminishing social protection remain unsolved. Although labour 
reform has reduced hiring costs, it has done so at the expense of labour quality, job stability and 
working conditions. In this regard, Reich (2001) and Cappelli (1999) affirm that the labour force is 
faced with a lack of job security, increasingly inequitable conditions and income levels, sorting and 
intense competition. He also argues that reliability and loyalty to the organization (firm or 
conglomerate) are no longer rewarded with stability, career prospects or access to the homogenized 
and homogenizing middle class. The institutional structure of labour markets has thus been 
destabilized and reorganized. 
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Sluggish and inconsistent job creation has been accompanied by an increase in informal 
employment, which undermines social protection mechanisms (see, table 3). Moreover, young 
people and women are over-represented in the informal workforce. Although the female labour 
force participation rate has increased, women are still subject to considerable employment and wage 
differentials with respect to men. This is a clear indication that serious access problems persist in 
these sectors (ECLAC, 2001). 
In summary, it can be concluded that the reforms have failed to live up to expectations. They 
have not only failed to generate more employment, but have actually widened the wage gap 
between skilled and unskilled workers, led to a worsening of already substandard working 
conditions and made it apparent that the region’s comparative advantages do not lie in unskilled 
labour. ECLAC (2000) sums up the situation as follows: “employment…in the region is 
significantly lacking in terms of its level”, as well as in terms of “marked inequities in access to 
productive jobs and a deterioration in…social welfare systems.” The reforms have, however, also 
had a number of positive effects, such as increases in productivity and in the educational level of a 
workforce in which a significantly larger percentage of women are participating.  
Labour-market reforms have been guided, to a great extent, by the view that flexibility is a 
necessary factor in overcoming pre-existing problems and in easing the Latin American and 
Caribbean economies’ adjustment to today’s globalized economy. In point of fact, the region’s 
experiences with labour-market reform tend to reflect a rather mechanical application of the concept 
of flexibilization as presented in orthodox textbooks.  
The argument that difficulties in reducing unemployment are attributable to a refusal by 
labour to accept lower wages and more flexibility is not clearly supported by the facts. 
Unemployment in Latin America is not associated with high wages or widespread rigidities. 
Instead, variations in employment are associated with the level of economic activity and structural 
difficulties, as those associated to the specialization pattern and the structural heterogeneity of the 
production system (ECLAC, 2000 and 2002). Only a very small part of the current situation can be 
explained by what may be called voluntary unemployment, that is “the refusal or inability of a unit 
of labour, as a result of legislation or social practices or of combination for collective bargaining or 
of slow response to change or mere human obstinacy, to accept a reward corresponding to the value 
of the product attributable to its marginal productivity” (Keynes 1936, pp. 6).  
The explanation for what has happened lies primarily in the concept of “involuntary 
unemployment” as expounded by Keynes and in the production system’s structure. Low levels of 
activity (low investment, low propensity to consume) and biased specializations, which are adverse 
to the incorporation of non-skilled labour and do nothing to dispel balance-of-payment difficulties, 
are the structural reason for unemployment.  
(b) Sectors facing access difficulties 
Certain sectors typically face difficulties in gaining access to the labour market, often 
because of poor initial endowments –in terms of education, experience or the ability to delegate 
childcare responsibilities– that prevent their full integration into the labour market. Two groups that 
are particularly affected –women and youth– will be discussed here. 
(i) Women 
Studies conducted under the GTZ project have concluded that Latin American countries 
perform like other developed economies reducing the gap between male and female employment 
conditions. This outcome is, however, counterbalanced by the finding that, despite the regulatory 
flexibility introduced by the reform process, policies directed at expanding the “initial endowments” 
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of women (i.e., better education and support for working women, particularly those with children) 
are still needed in order to provide women with access to higher quality positions. Thus, problems 
of access –and especially access to good jobs– are also associated with excluded agents’ lack of 
endowments (mainly educational background and training).  
At a general level, it is still under debate whether the increase of women’s participation in 
labour market: (i) has eliminated the structural difficulties of reducing the unemployment rate; (ii) is 
a direct result of the introduction of greater flexibility in the labour market; or (ii) can be regarded 
as an actual increase in access or simply as a replacement of existing workers with workers who are 
prepared (or need to) accept lower-paid jobs under more flexible contractual terms and conditions5. 
In the following, we shall discuss some brief answers to these questions.  
Empirical evidences indicate that women labor participation increased from 37,9% to 42% in 
the 1990s, and 20 millions of women have been integrated in the labor market (see table 1). 
However, the women’s employment growth rate (2.8% annual average rate between 1990 and 
1999) did not increase in order to absorb the higher women participation growth rate (3,6% annual 
average rate, in the same period); thus, the unemployment rate of growth have been increased (13% 
annual average rate). This situation is also reflected by the difference of the unemployment growth 
rate in the period, which increased form 5,1% in 1990 to 11,2% in 1999 (this represent an increase 
from 2,7 to 8,1 million of women in the same period).  
A number of the characteristics (most of which have a strong cultural component) displayed 
by Latin American societies make it difficult for women to become fully integrated into the 
workforce or to gain access to higher wage levels and positions of responsibility. Certain features 
can be identified, on both the supply and demand sides, which influence women’s opportunities for 
joining the labour market and their incentives for doing so.  
On the supply side, some of the important factors that influence women’s participation in the 
labour market are: (i) the fact that domestic responsibilities are usually undertaken by women; (ii) 
within the family unit, their access to education tends to be more restricted than that of men6; and (iii) 
rates of participation are usually higher among young women and women at higher income levels. 
On the demand side, influential factors include: (i) the higher cost (in the formal market), in terms 
of expenditures and medical leave, of hiring women; (ii) turnover costs and training replacements; (iii) 
the fact that in some societies women are still perceived as being incapable of performing certain 
activities; and, lastly, (iii) the greater flexibility of the labour market, which has increased the likelihood 
of women being hired because they are often willing to accept poorer working conditions.  
The above characteristics together with urbanisation process growing (which in part this can 
be explained by the incapability of the agriculture sector to generate employment), with the 
increased educational levels of women (that give better conditions to labor market), and finally, the 
fact that the employment was generated in activities where the women have higher rate participation 
(for example, informal activities, commerce, finance and domestics services) can explain the huge 
increment in the labor participation rate of the women. 
The wage gap between men and women has decreased as women with higher levels of 
education have joined the workforce. As shown in table 4, there is a strong correlation between 
women’s education and the men/women wage gap. With the exception of Peru, all the countries that 
were studied recorded an improvement in the educational levels of the female labour force and all, 
except Peru, had managed to narrow the wage gap. 
                                                     
5  For further information, see Pereira de Melo (2000), Lavinas (2000), Barros, Corseuil and Santos (2000), and Comin and Guimarães (2000). 
6  Although the educational gap between women and man has been reduced. It can be observed, however, that men level of education is 
higher ( Weller, 2000a, León, 2001). 
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The increase in female unemployment rates is not the only negative aspect. As León’s paper 
(2001) mentions, “Women’s working life expectancy is lower; they experience a less continuous 
career path from one job contract to another; and, although women were found to have greater 
access to part-time employment, this occurred mainly in the under-25 and over-49 age groups, i.e., 
among those women who were less likely to be responsible for the care of young children. In 
addition, part-time work was mainly available in smaller firms, which meant that the persons filling 
those jobs were less likely to have an employment contract, social security coverage or an hourly 
wage comparable to that of full-time workers.” 
From the standpoint of women, the relative success of the reforms in raising the participation 
rate and narrowing the wage gap is therefore arguably insufficient, as no policy has yet been 
adopted to resolve their entitlement problems by, in particular, affording them better access to 
education within the family group and enabling them to dissociate themselves from household 
responsibilities such as child care. The female labour force participation rate may have risen, but 
this has been the result of an expansion of supply and has occurred within a framework of a more 
higher unemployment rate and worsening labour conditions, in which the labour-absorbing 
activities have typically corresponded to tertiary and informal nontradable and low-productivity 
sectors, respectively. In consequence, in the absence of policies to address access problems, it will 
be difficult for women to improve their status in the labour market. 
 
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA (EIGHT COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN WOMEN’S POSITION IN 
THE LABOUR MARKET, BY SKILL LEVELS AND RELATIVE WAGES, 1990s 
Country and period a/ Share of university graduates in 
female wage employment 
 Wage gap: men/women (%) 
 Year 1b Year 2b  Year 1b Year 2b 
Argentina, 1991-1997  
Bolivia, 1989-1996  
Brazil, 1992-1997  
Chile, 1992-1996  
Colombia, 1988-1995  
Costa Rica, 1990-1996 
Mexico, 1991-1997 
Peru, 1991-1997 
27.6 
17.9 
16.9 
34.6 
14.8 
18.3 
14.6 
33.5 
35.7 
23.0 
18.1 
34.7 
18.8 
23.3 
19.2 
32.2 
 n.d. 
137.3 
140.9 
132.8 
167.6 
121.6 
137.5 
132.3 
n.d. 
125.0 
128.2 
127.5 
133.1 
120.8 
121.6 
132.4 
Source: Jurgen Weller, Economic Reforms, Growth and Employment: Labour Markets in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Libros de la CEPAL series, No. 66 (LC/G.2121-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2001. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.II.G.19, p. 136, table VI.8.  
a/ The data refer to the national total, except for Argentina (urban areas), Bolivia (departmental capitals and El Alto) and 
Brazil (six metropolitan areas). b/ Years 1 and 2 refer to the initial and final years of the periods indicated in the first 
column. 
(ii) Young people 
Young people are another group that experiences considerable problems in accessing the 
labour market, and in this case the evidence points to increasing difficulties in the region. A 
decrease in youth labour force participation rates is a corollary to an increase in the amount of time 
spent in the educational system, but, at the same time, the percentage of young people who neither 
work nor study has also risen. “Lower participation rates were found to be most prevalent among 
young men and were on the rise in most countries… The proportion of young people working on an 
unregistered basis and without social security coverage increased from 42% in 1990 to 47% in 
1998; in fact, only two out of every six were engaged in formal activities, and only one out of every 
six employed in informal activities was covered by health and pension provisions. The wage gap 
between young people in formal and informal activities increased from 39% to 44% during that 
same period” (León, 2001). Thus, in many cases, low skill levels and the associated decline in their 
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chances of finding jobs discourage young people from seeking productive employment and these 
youths therefore turn to more risky alternatives in an effort to escape poverty. It is well known that 
in many cases this situation is one of the causes of juvenile delinquency (ECLAC, 2000). 
The overall decline in the labour force participation rate was not enough to prevent 
unemployment from increasing from 8% in 1990 to 16% in 1999. Those who were affected the 
most were young people from poor households, who pushed up both the participation rate (as they 
sought to augment their incomes) and unemployment. The position of young people from better-off 
households was slightly different, as their participation rate fell (though it continued to be higher 
than the rate for young people from poor households) while the number of such persons who were 
unemployed increased. The overall situation was exacerbated by the fact that almost all youth 
employment was created in the informal sector, which caused the level of social protection to fall. 
In summary, there is cause for major concern regarding access, rising unemployment and the 
worsening of working conditions. 
From the above, we can observe that the insufficient growth rate of the economy has forced 
poor and younger people towards an early insertion in the labor market; thus, they are employed in 
jobs with low quality, affecting also their access to a better education and better jobs in the future 
(ECLAC, 1999). The insufficient economic dynamism and the lack of social security have affected 
also with more intensity to more weak sectors of society, who have been forcing to assume a over-
representation in the informal sector, with jobs characterised by the insufficient laboral conditions. 
In the women case, the greater education and the new spirit of participation was hit strongly by the 
increase for finding a job. In the young people case, the great permanence in the educational system 
(and the decrease in the labor participation) was done in the same time with the unemployment 
increased, and the fact more worrisome of all, with the inequity difference between rich and poor 
householder, that aim towards to consolidation of inequity in Latin America.  
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III. Financial Markets 
The case for the creation and expansion of public financial 
institutions was solidly based on the mainstream fiscalist-Keynesian 
approach of the 1950s and 1960s. It is important to note, however, that 
it was also founded upon more orthodox schools of economic analysis, 
such as that of Gurley and Shaw (1955). Using a completely orthodox 
approach to the question of development finance, the latter authors 
argued that financial underdevelopment meant that savers had no 
savings instruments available to them and that potential savings were 
therefore either left idle (via hoarding) or were simply spent on 
consumption. Financial underdevelopment thus led to lower levels of 
loanable funds being made available for productive investment and, 
hence, to lower investment in underdeveloped economies (with 
underdeveloped financial markets).  
In the 1970s, however, this picture changed significantly, as did 
the way in which the problem of financial underdevelopment and its 
relationship with development finance were perceived.  
From a political standpoint, by then most of the industrial 
economies of Europe and Japan had fully recovered, and development 
was a politically important issue only because of the Cold War. On 
theoretical grounds, following the development of orthodox finance 
theory, which is strongly based on the efficient-market hypothesis, the 
role of the State in the financing of productive investment was 
increasingly disputed. The most prominent works to promote this 
change in intellectual perspective were the seminal works of Shaw 
(1973) and McKinnon (1973), the founding fathers of the financial 
liberalization theory. The starting point for this approach was the idea  
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that financial repression –a mixture of financial policies, including interest-rate ceilings, selective 
credit and other forms of government intervention in capital markets– is the cause, rather than the 
consequence, of low levels of private saving and investment finance.7 
In the 1980s this approach began to predominate in the views expressed by multilateral 
agencies, which increasingly included financial liberalization as part of their “conditionalities” for 
refinancing developing economies during the years of the debt crisis. Then, in the 1990s, most of 
the Latin American governments began to embrace the financial liberalization strategy, which 
entailed not only some deregulation of domestic markets (domestic financial liberalization) and the 
opening up of their capital accounts (financial opening), but also some deliberate steps towards 
downsizing public financial systems and the opening of their domestic financial sectors to foreign 
actors (particularly foreign banks). Of course, in many cases this simply involved a reduction in the 
number and role of certain public financial institutions, such as development banks.8 
(a) Financial reforms and the conventional wisdom 
As mentioned earlier, until recently the lack of a solid financial structure that would provide a 
supportive environment for the development process was mainly attributed to financial repression. 
Briefly stated, the advocates of this hypothesis contended that the lack of financial deepening and 
credit rationing of the type described above were caused9 by excessive controls (repression) on 
existing financial institutions and that the maintenance of interest rate ceilings created disincentives 
for saving and for the intermediation of saving, thereby placing supply-side constraints on the 
potential supply of finance.  
Thus, in the 1980s it came to be widely believed that financial liberalization and a significant 
reduction in inflation would lead to the rapid growth of domestic saving, the development of 
domestic long-term loanable funds markets (e.g., capital markets, long-term securities markets and 
bank credit with substantially longer maturities) and wider access to foreign savings. In the 1990s, 
during the first generation of financial reforms, many development finance institutions in the region 
were either dismantled or downsized significantly, thus reducing the role of the State. Those that 
survived did not, in many cases, have the benefit of appropriate policies that would help them 
modernize their operations or adjust to the new conditions created by financial opening and 
financial deregulation.  
The modernization of the banking system and its harmonization with the provisions of new 
international agreements have been addressed through a “second-generation” of financial reforms. 
As discussed in detail in Stallings and Studart (2002), most of these reforms have been aimed at 
achieving financial stability through improved domestic regulation and supervision. Indeed, 
although most of the changes in bank regulation and supervision in Latin America have been made 
in response to events in individual countries or, to some extent, in the region more broadly 
(especially in the case of the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995), developments at the international level 
have also played a role. In particular, the Bank for International Settlements and the Basel 
                                                     
7  As the argument went, low (or even negative) real interest rates led to low levels of private saving. Three consequences of low levels of 
saving were: (i) a limited supply of private funding for investment, which forced governments to introduce selective credit policies under 
which development banks were the main instruments; (ii) because of the inherently political nature in which the allocation of public credit 
was determined, an innefficiency bias tended to arise in the allocation of scarce capital that led to lower long-term growth; and (iii) 
because of the low interest rates, even the government was unable to finance its own deficit, which led to inflationary deficit financing and 
thus to inflation. 
8  See: Acevedo (2000). 
9  This is an extraordinary reversal of the causality found in the early works of Gurley and Shaw (1955), in which financial 
underdevelopment was seen as the cause of a poor allocation of existing savings. 
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Committee on Banking Supervision have been influential in putting these issues onto the agenda 
and moving towards a convergence of standards for developed and developing countries alike. At 
present, however, international standards themselves are in a state of flux, and the proposed changes 
pose new challenges for developing-country institutions. 
The 1988 Basel Capital Accord (Basel I) was a milestone in banking regulation. The 8% 
minimum capital requirement for internationally active banks, which was adopted by over 100 
countries (including most in Latin America), clearly improved financial stability. Nonetheless, the 
criticism began to emerge that the approach was too rigid and simplistic and that it did not 
correspond to actual levels of risk. Developing countries were especially concerned that the rules 
might provide incentives for short-term rather than long-term lending, and that increased the 
procyclical nature of financial intermediation.10 
The revised Accord, or Basel II, is intended to correct the problems that have been identified 
by introducing more complex procedures for determining risk, including the use of models 
developed by individual banks. Experts studying the potential impact on developing countries fear, 
however, that the new approach could have a negative impact on those economies through three 
channels. First, they believe that the new risk categories are likely to lead to a significant decline in 
lending to developing countries or to a sharp increase in the cost of such credit. Second, as 
mentioned above, they view the new system as being inherently procyclical, a feature that would 
increase the frequency of crises that have an especially negative impact on the developing world. In 
part because of these criticisms, the implementation of Basel II has been postponed to allow for 
further study.11 Third many feared that the more restrictive risk-management system introduced by 
the Accord would increase even further the discrimination against SME (e.g. Griffith-Jones and 
Ocampo, 2002). 
In a parallel initiative, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have introduced 
some 60 standards and codes designed to increase financial stability by providing policy 
benchmarks. On this basis, Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) have been 
incorporated into the Fund’s surveillance of member countries’ economies through the Financial 
Sector Assessment Program. While agreeing that these measures could be helpful, developing-
country representatives have expressed concern about the fact that they have no say in determining 
these standards and that implementing all of them would be an extremely expensive undertaking. At 
the same time, they fear that if they are unable (or unwilling) to comply, their chances of obtaining 
finance may be further reduced.12 
By the end of the millennium, most financial systems in Latin America (or at least those of 
the largest economies) had implemented a majority of the first-generation reforms (financial 
liberalization, opening of the capital account and reduction of the role of the State in financial 
intermediation) and some of the second-generation reforms, particularly those relating to the 1988 
Basel Accord recommendations along with the changes proposed in 1995. The question now is how 
such reforms have affected the stability of the system, its overall performance (in terms of the 
growth of credit, for instance) and access to the financial system for vulnerable sectors. This 
question will be discussed in the next two sections. 
                                                     
10  For an analysis of the procylcical nature of financial systems, see e.g. Borio, C., Furfine C. and Lowe, P (2001) ‘Procyclicality of the 
financial system and financial stability: issues and policy options.’ In, BIS Papers No. 1, Marrying the macro- and microprudential 
dimensions of financial stability. http://www.bis.org/publ/bispap01.htm. Many authors (e.g. Griffith-Jones and Spratt, 2002, and 
Ocampo and Chiape, 2002) apply the procyclicality argument to criticize the. Ocampo J.A. and Chiappe, M.L. (2001) Counter-
Cyclical Prudential and Capital Account Regulation in Developing Countries. Paper prepared for Swedish EGDI. 
11  For more details, see Griffith-Jones and Spratt, 2002. 
12  For a discussion of these codes and standards as seen from a developing-country perspective, see IMF Survey, 2 April 2001. 
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(b) The overall result of the reforms 
As already discussed above, during the 1970s, most developing economies’ financial systems 
were under the control of the State. In East Asia, the private ownership of financial institutions has 
been counterbalanced by strict government control over lending rates and the channelling of credit. 
In most Latin American economies, public institutions (commercial and development banks) have 
played a crucial role in financing specific –often “targeted”– economic sectors. In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, this institutional structure began to be called into question, and reforms were 
undertaken. These financial reforms were initiated for what were often very different reasons, 
however. In many East Asian economies, financial reforms were in many cases introduced purely in 
response to pressure from multilateral agencies and governments, which is why some policy makers 
in these countries resisted them so strongly. 
In Latin America, on the other hand, the reforms were facilitated and strongly supported by 
domestic economic agents due to a general perception that the institutional structures set up in many 
of these countries during the 1970s had seriously deteriorated. Indeed, given the macroeconomic 
uncertainties of the 1980s, when high inflation and highly volatile growth were common features, 
private financial institutions and markets tended to operate in the very short-term segment of the 
financial intermediation market. This was also a decade marked by difficulties in maintaining fiscal 
discipline and by large public debts. The combination of a risk-averse private financial sector and 
high levels of public indebtedness often forced public financial institutions to play an increasingly 
important role in refinancing domestic private and public debt, thereby tying their fates to those of 
national and/or subnational governments. Consequently, by the end of the 1980s many Latin 
American economies’ public financial sectors were experiencing severe solvency problems. 
Securities markets, for their part, have never been leading actors in the provision of 
development financing in most developing economies, except perhaps in some East Asian 
economies, where markets for corporate bonds have played an important role, particularly in the 
1980s. In Latin America, however, the macroeconomic uncertainties referred to earlier have been a 
significant deterrent to their development, and in those cases where such securities markets have 
been significant, they have tended to be highly concentrated in few –often publicly owned– 
companies. 
Although the pre-existing investment finance mechanisms (such as development banks) have 
been downsized (and in some cases, dismantled altogether), there is as yet little indication that 
private domestic markets will naturally or spontaneously fill this gap. Financial opening and 
integration have not created a sufficient condition for the development of domestic capital markets, 
and this is especially true in the case of primary markets, which could be a source of capital for 
business firms. In addition, many sectors –particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, low-
cost housing construction, technology-related companies, etc.– continue to lack access to the scant 
supply of private financing. 
In sum, in the early 1990s developing-economy financial systems, and particularly those of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, continued to suffer from the similar structural problems as those 
described by Goldsmith (1969) in the 1960s:13  
(a) The banking sector remained relatively small, its lending activity was quite limited, its 
operations were concentrated in short-term activities (including the refinancing of 
government debt) and it was highly vulnerable to external shocks;  
                                                     
13  Evidence to this effect is presented in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine and Maksimovic 2000. 
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(b) The supply of loanable funds to specific sectors continued to be strictly rationed,14 which 
means that, for many sectors, the credit market is supply-constrained, and these 
expenditures thus tend to be highly sensitive to changes in the supply of loanable funds; 
(c) Net interest margins in developing countries’ banking sectors were still much higher than 
they were in developed economies; this points to the existence of very wide spreads, which 
resulted in non-competitive financial costs for domestic corporate sectors and high levels of 
self-financing (which is a deterrent to economic expansion);  
(d) Securities markets remained small, and the primary markets actually shrank in the 1990s 
(see Dowers, Gomez-Acebo, and Masci. (2000)). 
Furthermore, in the late1980s and early 1990s, Latin American economies opened up their 
capital accounts and their domestic financial markets to foreign investors. These reforms not only 
seen to have failed to increase domestic saving, but also appear to have increased the region’s 
dependency on foreign capital for a number of reasons.  
One of these factors was that bank credit was still highly cyclical and, in many economies, 
tended to favour consumption rather than investment in the 1990s. The problem of credit stagnation 
also became more acute after 199719-98 (Barajas and Steiner, 2002).  
In addition, many sectors –such as small and medium-sized enterprises, low-cost housing 
construction, technology-related companies, etc.– continued to lack access to what little private 
financing was available. 
Thus, as indicated by various ECLAC studies (see, for example, Held and Jimenez, 2001; 
Studart and Stallings, 2002), and in contrast to what the financial repression hypothesis would lead 
one to expect, in several cases financial liberalization (which in theory would make financial 
intermediation more flexible and markets more efficient) and the existence of high real returns on 
financial assets have not led to higher levels of aggregate saving or investment, or even to further 
financial deepening. In addition, as the project paper on financial markets indicated, even in Chile, 
where financial development in the 1990s was by far the best success story, access to financing for 
housing construction and access to credit for SMEs did not improve, and specific policies to deal 
with credit rationing in these excluded sectors were therefore required. The studies summarized by 
Dini (2001) also indicate that where access for SMEs has expanded, this has been made possible by 
the reform of pre-existing public financial institutions. 
(c) Sectors facing access difficulties 
In a recent report, the Inter-American Development Bank (2001) states that “... the major 
problem faced by businesses in Latin America and the Caribbean is accessing financial markets. In 
18 of the 20 Latin American countries covered by the World Business Environment Survey, access 
to credit was reported by entrepreneurs as their most serious concern.” There is, in fact, a general 
consensu that problems of access to financing are one of the main pitfalls for smaller enterprises 
and for those seeking access to low-income housing (Held, 1999 and 2000; Szalachman, 2000; 
Alarcón and Stumpo, 2001). 
This problem stems mainly from market failures, which arise when the conditions required 
for perfect competition do not exist and, as a result, resources are improperly distributed. The root 
of these market imperfections lies in significant problems of scale, which prevent these sectors from 
                                                     
14  The rationing of financing for low-cost housing, SMEs, low-income consumers and long-term productive investments is particularly 
marked in most Latin American economies.  
Institutional  requirements for market-led development in Latin America 
 28 
gaining access to credit at market prices, and in the existence of information asymmetries, which 
make it very costly to establish the payment capacity of these agents.  
Thus, unless the public sector allocates resources to resolve these distortions, these sectors 
will be excluded from the credit market. The amount of resources needed to resolve this problem 
can be expected to vary according to the differing degrees of development of the credit and 
financial markets in each country, with the more financially advanced economies exhibiting a 
smaller number of marginalized sectors. 
(i) Financing for SMEs 
The problem of providing financing for these smaller enterprises has always figured on the 
political agenda, but its significance has changed over time.15 During the period of SLI, the State 
was expected to take an active role and to provide adequate mechanisms for developing the local 
production base, but after the reforms this essential role was transferred to the market. 
The traditional policies concerning credit for smaller enterprises were based on a system of 
"first-tier" banks and public lending institutions that offered subsidized interest rates, together with 
a few "second-tier" credit lines for intermediation with the small number of "first-tier" private 
lending institutions. Moreover, in order to offer an incentive for private-sector participation, 
guarantee funds were used to share the credit risk of smaller enterprises. Via this mechanism, the 
public sector took on the risk represented by non-performing loans. These efforts did not, however, 
succeed in resolving small businesses’ access problems. They had no significant overall impact on 
the situation of such enterprises, while large losses were incurred owing to the difficulties involved 
in refinancing and collecting on non-performing loans (Held, 1999). 
The reforms also brought a shift in the focus of the State in this area towards a more market-
led allocation of resources. This policy can be divided into two specific aspects: (i) allocation of 
(public and private) funds by private institutions, together with a reduction in the role of public 
institutions; and (ii) market determination of interest rates. An associated argument was that 
subsidized interest rates were an obstacle to the development of the financial market because they 
allowed the implementation of less profitable projects. 
Subsidized interest rates were discarded, and the focus shifted to reducing transaction costs 
so that marginalized sectors could have access to market interest rates. This change was motivated 
by the fact that the market tends to exclude smaller enterprises because of the low rate of return to 
the private sector on the provision of small-scale finance, which is in large part due to the high 
transaction (i.e., risk-evaluation, administration and collection) costs.  
In larger countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the public sector plays an important 
and wide-ranging role in first-tier financing. In other countries –such as Chile, Colombia and Costa 
Rica– new roles were assigned to the public and private sectors. Public credit institutions took 
assume important functions in the second-tier bank, while private credit institutions became the first 
tier. This helped to reduce the State’s level of risk considerably. In this approach, the private sector 
is responsible for distributing and administering loans and takes on the risk of non-payment, while 
allowing the public sector to concentrate on bringing smaller enterprises into the financial sector 
and on trying to reduce credit risk and the high costs of loan disbursement, monitoring and 
collection. It can also hold competitive auctions for the funds allocated for this purpose in order to 
avoid giving implicit subsidies to the first-tier banks and credit institutions.  
The implementation of economic reforms delayed the progress of credit and financing 
policies for smaller enterprises to some extent, mainly because of the greater degree of attention 
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devoted to macroeconomic stabilization and adjustment policies. As noted earlier, these new credit 
and financing policies were focused on providing access to credit at the market interest rate, and 
many new instruments were devised. Some of them performed very well, but they did not succeed 
in having a significant impact because a very small proportion of such enterprises actually benefited 
from them (Held, 1999; Peres and Stumpo, 2002). In other words, "These experiences show the 
progress made in applying instruments at market interest rates and conditions. They have not, 
however, resulted in policies that are sufficiently clear at the institutional level, and that could 
resolve in an integral and coordinated manner the credit restrictions affecting those enterprises" 
(Held, 1999, p.5). 
In relation to access to technology, the paper prepared by Dini (2001) also presents some 
interesting results regarding SME access to financial markets. This paper analyses the policies 
applied in support of SMEs in three economies: Chile, Brazil and Mexico. In Chile, (an early 
reformer) and Mexico, there was a reduction in financial support for SMEs in the 1980s, although 
in Mexico this was mainly due to the solvency problems16 whereas in Chile it was purely a result of 
the convictions of policy-makers. In Brazil, public financial institutions that assist SMEs –the 
Serviço Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas (SEBRAE) and the Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), for instance– were also involved in significant 
retrenchment efforts, but again this had more to do with fiscal problems and macroeconomic 
uncertainty (leading to lower demand for credit) than with any clear strategy for downsizing the role 
of the State in this field. In contrast to the situation in the 1980s, during the 1990s financial support 
for SMEs has increased in both Chile and Brazil, but no such rise has been seen in the case of 
Mexico.  
In Chile, the most evident change has not been so much in the State’s role in transferring 
funds, but in how these funds have been allocated, as an increasing portion of these funds have been 
transferred to private institutions that have been given the responsibility of administering their 
allocation. Programmes such as PROFOS, FAT, FONDEF and other small-scale projects have 
played an increasingly important role in supporting Chilean SMEs in their technological 
restructuring and outward-looking strategies. In the case of Brazil, resources allocated to support 
SMEs stagnated in the 1980s, but during the 1990s funds transferred by BNDES increased 
substantially, reaching record levels by the end of the decade. In Mexico, there is compelling 
evidence of a reduction in financial support for SMEs, while at the same time the allocation of those 
funds has been reoriented towards more horizontal policies.  
Research on financing for SMEs indicate that a great deal of emphasis has been placed on 
"liberalizing the markets" (that is, freeing up interest rates and the allocation of private credit) while 
little priority has been assigned to institution-building. This lack of a "positive" approach to the 
problem is associated with the priority that has been given to the reduction of public expenditures in 
a context of fiscal adjustment. 
Moreover, some of the problems that have typically troubled SMEs seem to be worsened. A 
higher degree of segmentation has been observed, for example, between large firms and SMEs. This 
segmentation usually leads to a suboptimal choice of projects, as the available financial resources 
are allocated to large enterprises while, very often, more viable projects planned by smaller 
businesses are left without financing. Some of the reasons for this are the following: (i) SMEs 
generally have very little banking history, so there is little information available for their credit 
applications; (ii) smaller enterprises usually have fewer assets to put up as collateral; (iii) the 
smaller amounts of credit that SMEs apply for do not necessarily involve lower transaction costs 
within the banking system; and (iv) many SMEs are unfamiliar with the procedures for applying for 
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credit and may even lack the administrative capacity to follow them (Kesselman, 1998). In sum, as 
may be seen from this brief analysis, the theoretical and historical bases for the financial reforms 
that were pursued were –if not entirely erroneous– at least clearly flawed and, not surprisingly, their 
results were disappointing.  
(ii) Financing for low-income housing 
Public programmes have continued to be the main source of financing for low-income 
housing, but the allocation of funding through private financial institutions has been on the rise. The 
increase in allocative efficiency can be evaluated using three criteria: transparency and impartiality, 
neutrality, and the targeting of those agents that have the least access to private markets. Held's 
analysis points up clear advances in terms of the first two criteria, but very little progress in respect 
of the third. This finding is of special concern for the project, since it is precisely this third aspect 
that matters the most in evaluating access.17 
How to go about providing access to housing for individuals and households with low 
incomes is a question that has not yet been satisfactorily resolved. The marginalization of this 
segment of the population is a consequence of the credit and financial market’s inability to serve 
this sector properly. The low income levels of this sector of the population impedes access to credit 
and, even if access is obtained, the cost of the loan is the greatest risk factor for non-payment, 
together with the proportionally higher transaction costs for smaller loans. It should be noted that 
the concept of marginalization that is used here refers to difficulties in gaining access both to 
housing and to better living conditions. The absolute lack of housing is reflected in the quantitative 
deficit, while the deterioration in living conditions (i.e., the quality of housing and the supply of 
basic services) is reflected in the qualitative deficit (Szalachman, 2000). 
The public policies implemented in an effort to correct this problem have usually involved 
supply-side subsidies, with the persons concerned making small, indirect contributions in the form 
of payroll deductions. These policies have not succeeded in eliminating the accumulated housing 
deficit, however, which is often the result of high population growth rates and high levels of rural-
to-urban migration. The new housing policies established in the framework of the market-economy 
reforms have included a demand-side subsidy designed to increase the purchasing capacity of 
persons with lower incomes. Prior savings have been a condition for the award of these subsidies, 
since they are regarded as evidence of a capacity for home ownership, as well as reducing the 
amount of credit needed for the purchase.18 
At the same time, the public sector has focused on facilitating access to housing loans on 
market terms and conditions by subsidizing the transaction costs of private credit institutions that 
offer such loans. The amounts of the subsidies allocated for this purpose depend to a large extent on 
the degree of development of the credit and financial market, its capacity to reach marginalized 
sectors and the availability of long-term funds. 
Land policy, which is one of the determinants of the cost of housing, is becoming an 
increasingly influential factor, yet it is one to which countries have not paid sufficient attention. 
Steps should be taken to reserve land for use within the context of policies that would allow the 
increase in value of the land to be shared with targeted households or individuals, as otherwise the 
price of the land becomes another obstacle to access for this sector of the population. Another factor 
has to do with the tendency to focus on the provision of housing subsidies for the purchase of new 
homes, which reduces the quantitative deficit by facilitating the construction and subsequent 
purchase of new housing units. This type of policy has not, however, addressed the need to 
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encourage housing mobility, and there is a lack of programmes for the improvement and expansion 
of existing homes. The latter factor, together with the lack of a secondary market for low-cost 
housing, has led to an increase in the qualitative housing deficit (Held, 2000; Szalachman, 2000). 
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IV. Technology markets 
Market organization and microeconomic behaviour in the area 
of knowledge generation and dissemination have changed dramatically 
since the import-substitution SLI period. Many knowledge-generation 
activities have disappeared, while others that are more in line with the 
region’s emerging production structure are gradually appearing. Public 
and private R&D labs and departments have either been closed or their 
agendas, aims and constraints have changed significantly following the 
privatization of major industries (ECLAC 2002).  
(a) Industrialization and technological 
capabilities  
During the Second World War and in the early 1950s, each of 
the Latin American countries developed its own strong sector of public 
enterprises responsible for the production of goods and services in 
fields such as telecommunications, energy or transport and in strategic 
industries such as iron and steel, aluminium or petrochemicals. These 
production activities demanded not only new production facilities –
which were sometimes purchased on a turn-key basis from 
international subcontractors– but also a steady flow of new 
technologies and engineering services that had to be obtained in situ. 
Accordingly, many of them created R&D departments and project 
design groups whose main purpose was to generate new knowledge 
and adapt imported technologies to local circumstances. As part of this 
State-led process, some countries developed sophisticated know-how 
in vanguard industries, such as nuclear technology in the case of  
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Argentina and aeronautics in Brazil. These industries were to play an important role in these 
countries’ technological development many years after the start-up of these activities. Three 
patterns of technological capability generation, which are associated with three different types of 
firms, can be identified (ECLAC, 2002). 
(i) From the very beginning, foreign capital in Latin America has functioned as the engine for 
growth in knowledge-intensive branches such as motor vehicles, pharmaceutical raw materials, 
petrochemicals, production equipment and machinery. The presence of these firms has generated 
significant externalities. Indeed, capital goods and the flow of engineering, managerial and 
marketing knowledge from foreign enterprises has deeply affected the industrial culture of the 
region, introducing working habits, labour rules and practices, quality-control standards and forms 
of subcontracting that, in many cases, were previously unknown in the local environment. 
Although transnational corporations did not come to the region with the explicit aim of 
developing a local technological infrastructure, in practice they often ended up doing so. Given the 
firm-specific nature of technology as a factor of production and the need to adapt it to the specific 
circumstances that surround its utilization in any one particular production facility, many of these 
firms were obliged to create engineering departments, as well as groups capable of providing 
technical assistance to production engineers, in order to operate in the domestic environment 
efficiently.  
The technological efforts undertaken by such firms were generally aimed at taking product 
specifications, process technologies and organizational methods that had originally been developed 
by their parent companies for their home markets and then adapting them to local conditions. In this 
sense, these firms’ technological efforts can be regarded as adaptive. They were not particularly 
interested in developing know-how that would enhance their export potential, since most of them 
were geared exclusively towards the local market.  
(ii) Large public firms and locally-owned private conglomerates, which normally devoted 
themselves to the manufacture of consumer and intermediate goods or to the provision of services 
(energy, telecommunications) displayed a different model of technological behaviour. These firms 
developed their production and technological capabilities in sectors that were considered strategic 
for the industrialization policy at the time. The development of technological capabilities was more 
prominent and included everything from advances in the building and operation of new factories to 
the establishment of engineering departments and project offices that could design and optimize the 
use of production facilities. In many cases, these advances were promoted by public institutes, 
which took charge of many of the necessary tasks. Thus, for example, in the energy and 
telecommunications sector, State enterprises and research institutes were set up and provided with 
abundant financial resources. 
(iii) In parallel with these larger firms, many SMEs were set up in the region in the immediate 
post-war years. Tariff protection and subsidized public credit spurred the establishment of 
thousands of family enterprises producing textiles, garments, footwear, machine tools, equipment 
for the foodstuffs industry, furniture, agricultural machinery and so forth. Many of these firms 
managed to grow rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s, pari passu with aggregate demand. Even 
though many of them entered the market on the basis of self-designed and sometimes quasi-
artisanal product designs and production facilietis, they gradually developed technological and 
engineering capabilities which allowed them to make significant improvements in plant layout, 
product design engineering and production organization technologies.  
Some of these firms designed and even constructed their own machinery and equipment. It is 
quite clear that they underwent a highly idiosyncratic, long-term learning process. Unlike the 
subsidiaries of foreign firms that were examined earlier, in this case product and process 
technologies were created without any prior support from abroad, apart from the simple copying of 
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foreign technology and the technical training that many immigrant entrepreneurs brought with them 
from their home countries.  
Perhaps this is the reason why many industries were able to start catching up with the 
international productivity frontier long before the introduction of recent market-oriented structural 
reforms. A domestic learning processes and the development of domestic technological capabilities 
were clearly present during the years of the SLI period, with many domestic firms moving along 
their long-term learning curve. Nevertheless, only rarely did they develop innovative products and 
production processes that had repercussions beyond their national borders.  
In sum, local SMEs constituted another easily identifiable and circumscribed part of national 
innovation systems in the SLI period. They developed a technological “culture” based on the 
adaptation of foreign technology to local needs within a context of imperfect information, 
inadequate access to world markets for equipment and machinery, and scant competitive pressure in 
their home markets.  
(b) The overall result of the reforms 
As a consequence of the reforms, new patterns of production specialization and trade have 
emerged, with knowledge-intensive industries losing ground in terms of their contribution to GDP 
while non-tradable activities, natural-resource-processing industries and maquila-type assembly 
operations (catering mostly to United States markets) have gained ground. The production system 
of the 1990s engages the active participation of many new foreign firms that have recently entered 
the economy either through the privatization of public utilities or through takeovers of domestic 
companies (ECLAC 2000, 2002, Katz 2000b).19  
These firms do very little in terms of domestic knowledge generation. The countries in the 
region are therefore moving towards a more complex production structure which is closer to 
international productivity standards, but which is also less intensive in the use of local technical 
knowledge and engineering services. This process entails a significant degree of structural fragility if 
countries are to proceed up the value chain and move from simple, low-value-added commodities 
towards higher-value-added goods and services. As a result, the relative technological gap separating 
the region from international best practices has become narrower in certain areas of each production 
structure (e.g., telecommunications services, the Internet, or energy production and distribution), 
but overall, that gap is still exceedingly wide, even after so many years of trade liberalization and 
market deregulation efforts (Cimoli and Katz 2001). 
At a more micro level, dramatic changes in the sources of technical change and productivity 
growth have occurred, with a rapidly increasing proportion of technological development coming 
from external sources at the expense of domestic ones. Some of these sources are examined below. 
(1) Latin American and Caribbean countries have never been big spenders on technological 
development. R&D allocations have rarely surpassed 0.5%-0.7% of GDP, as against 1.5%-2.5% of 
GDP in many developed countries and in some of the Asian nations. Moreover, State-run firms, 
technological institutes and laboratories, and universities account for an overwhelming proportion 
of this sum. Only a small portion comes from private-sector agents such as local subsidiaries of 
transnational companies, large locally-owned conglomerates and local SMEs.  
(2) Productivity growth and competitiveness have increasingly been attained through the 
introduction of imported machinery and equipment, including new computer-based production 
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organization technologies, Material Resource Planning (MRP) and Supply Chain Management 
(SCM) software, etc. One of the factors in this shift has been trade liberalization, since it has made 
imported capital goods cheaper, thereby inducing their substitution for domestic capital goods and 
engineering services. Just as older vintages of machinery and equipment are rendered obsolete by 
the rapid inflow of new, computer-based machines, so, too, do certain forms of human capital lose 
relevance in the new production organization environment. Thus, a number of engineering activities 
that used to be carried out on the shop floor, either to extend the life cycle of old machines or to 
perform technical activities which have since become embodied in new equipment, are rendered 
unnecessary, and quite frequently the engineers and technicians involved in those activities can be 
dropped from the payroll. By the same token, entire R&D and project engineering departments can 
be eliminated when firms become part of worldwide integrated production systems, since those 
activities can then be transferred to the system’s headquarters.  
(3) This has also occurred in the case of public telecommunications, electricity and transport 
firms which, after privatization, have closed down their local R&D and engineering departments 
and begin to rely on their central offices for technology and engineering services. These changes in 
production organization involve the “destruction” of human capital and local technological 
capabilities and their substitution for capital-embodied new technology, as well as for externally-
produced R&D and engineering services. Some of the skills and technological capabilities rendered 
redundant by the new production organization arrangements can and have been successfully 
transferred to other areas of the economy (to, for instance, a newly emerging and rapidly expanding 
software industry) but there are clear differences across nations, regions and industries in the extent 
to which this kind of redeployment has actually taken place. 
(4) Internationally integrated production systems have significantly increased their share of 
GDP during the course of the past decade throughout Latin America. The local operation has 
primarily turned into an assembly activity that uses imported parts and components as well as 
externally-supplied technological and engineering services. This model is likely to lead to an 
increasingly dualistic production structure. This type of structure is composed, on the one hand, of a 
small group of technologically modern firms (local subsidiaries of transnational corporations and 
large domestic conglomerates) and, on the other, a large sector of local SMEs that have significant 
difficulties in gaining access to the modern technology they need to upgrade their production 
activities. This pattern reflect the features of what has been called “structural heterogeneity in the 
production and innovation systems” ECLAC (2000, 2002). 
In sum, the reforms have undermined efforts to upgrade local technological capabilities. 
Moreover, in a world where the production of knowledge enjoys increasing returns to scale and 
where externalities between firms and other repository institutions involved in the process of 
technology generation are clearly a factor, the globalization of economic activities is bound to 
generate a dualistic worldwide pattern of production organization in which R&D and engineering 
efforts are increasingly carried out by mature industrial countries while developing economies tend 
to specialize in the production of low-value-added industrial commodities and in-bond assembly 
industries.  
(i) Access for SMEs 
Confirming the above, the studies carried out during the present research project indicate that 
accessibility in knowledge and technology markets is strongly influenced by size differences across 
firms (Dini 2001, Peres and Stumpo 2000). SMEs have always had difficulties in accessing the new 
technologies required for successful restructuring, and they have lost ground in relation to large 
local conglomerates and subsidiaries of transnational corporations. The main outcomes identified by 
Dini (2001) in relation to access for SMEs have to do with changes in the principles underlying the 
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policies applied in this area, the institutional setting and the pattern of technological learning that 
takes place at the firm level.20  
Structural reforms have brought about a substantial change in the normative underpinnings of 
policies on SMEs. In most countries, policy makers generally espouse the principles of State 
subsidiarity and policy neutrality, place emphasis on industrial demand and take a horizontal view 
of the instruments that should be employed in order "to level the playing field," but major 
differences can be seen in how strictly these elements are applied. In addition, changes in policy 
orientation and in budget allocations for supporting actions have varied across countries. For 
example, Chile has been especially strict in applying these principles while, at the other extreme, 
there has been a great deal of flexibility in Brazil, with different policies being used for different 
sectors and geographical areas. Mexico is to be found in an intermediate point along this spectrum. 
The emphasis placed on the role of demand has helped to increase the efficiency of support 
programmes and to encourage the private sector to participate in the management of economic 
policies, thereby increasing the relevance of the development actions being subsidized by the State. 
These new policy features have reduced discrimination, increased the transparency of the system 
and helped ensure the relevance of the actions taken, but they cannot overcome the effects of the 
production system’s heterogeneity. In practice, these policies cannot be neutral, as there are 
transaction costs which constitute an entry barrier for access to the associated support programmes. 
The fact that such costs exist favours the enterprises that can pay them –which are usually those 
with the most resources and skills– and excludes all the other enterprises that "lack the minimum 
capacities needed to identify, formulate and manage their requirements" (Dini, page 28). At the 
same time, even when these problems of access are resolved, there is still the unknown factor of 
whether these enterprises have the necessary management skills to make efficient use of the 
resources made available to them. 
What is remarkable about these experiences is not so much that the reforms have not reduced 
public support for SMEs per se, but that they have done very little to augment the access of such 
enterprises to the technology they need to adjust to the new economic environment. In other words, 
in all of these countries, trade liberalization has left SMEs more exposed to foreign competition, but 
their access to local engineering services and to foreign capital goods and technology has not been 
facilitated to any significant degree.  
The instability of these policies has also been a constant problem since the implementation of 
economic reforms. Budgetary constraints have been one factor, since they have resulted in fewer 
resources being made available for the majority of institutions and programmes that support SMEs. 
However, instability is usually a reflection of changes in the significance of the policy within the 
government's agenda; this type of situation has led to a loss of accumulated skills and a lack of 
confidence in public policies on the part of the entrepreneurial sector. 
Many aspects of the initiatives taken at the budgetary and institutional levels have been 
affected by a marked degree of instability, with components often gaining or losing priority 
depending on what Administration is in office. This instability has also reduced policy efficiency 
because it leads to a dispersion of accumulated capacities and to a lack of clarity regarding the 
incentives for industry and about what can be expected from public action.  
Unlike the situation in the 1980s, during the 1990s the amount of financial support available 
for SMEs increased in both Chile and Brazil; this did not occur in the case of Mexico, however. In 
Brazil, resource allocations in support of SMEs stagnated in the 1980s, but during the 1990s the 
funds transferred by BNDES increased substantially, rising to record levels by the end of the 
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decade. In Mexico, there is significant evidence of a reduction in financial support for SMEs, at the 
same time that the focus of allocations has shifted towards more horizontal policies.  
These policies have also affected the institutional setting. In Mexico, the role of institutions 
supporting SMEs was reduced, but the reasons, in this case, were slow economic growth and fiscal 
difficulties that diminished the government’s capacity to play a more active role on this front. In 
addition, many of the existing development finance institutions –such as Nacional Financiera 
(NAFIN)– were experiencing significant financial difficulties owing to cutbacks in government 
funding and higher levels of default. In Brazil, public financial institutions that assist SMEs –
SEBRAE and BNDES, for instance– were also involved in significant retrenchment efforts, but 
again this had more to do with fiscal problems and macroeconomic uncertainty (leading to lower 
demand for credit) than with any clear strategy for downsizing the role of the State in this field. 
Until the 1990s, Chile was the country that introduced by far the strongest reforms. In this case, the 
most significant change has not been so much in the State’s role in transferring funds, but in how 
these funds have been allocated, as an increasing percentage of these funds have been transferred to 
private institutions which have been given the responsibility of administering their allocation. 
Programmes such as PROFOS, FAT, FONDEF and other small-scale projects have played an 
increasingly important role in supporting Chilean SMEs in their technological restructuring and 
outward-looking strategies.  
The new economic model has created an environment that is conducive to modernization, as 
the greater degree of economic openness has facilitated access to new technology through the 
purchase of new equipment. In addition, "although no exact data are available on the size of the 
enterprises concerned, this process has also included SMEs, according to the managers that were 
interviewed" (Dini 2001, page 22). 
The modernization of the production base has also, however, brought with it the obsolescence 
of knowledge. With the arrival of new equipment, existing knowledge and learning mechanisms 
cease to be useful and have to be adapted to new requirements through innovation of knowledge 
and the development of new management skills. This situation points up the importance of formal 
education, which facilitates the dissemination of new knowledge. Very few links have been found, 
however, between the educational system and the production base, and even R&D efforts have been 
limited. By the same token, mechanisms for creating linkages and generating complementarities 
among enterprises have been virtually non-existent, and networks of enterprises and institutions 
have not been established. On the few occasions that this has occurred, the links have not extended 
to the field of R&D. 
To sum up, the difficulties experienced by SMEs in gaining access to technology can 
basically be attributed to the existence of market failures, as insufficient information and 
heterogeneity in terms of the sizes of agents prevent them from gaining access to the technology 
market on equal terms. Moreover, this problem of access, which is also referred to by Amartya Sen, 
arises when endowments include the availability of human resources and capital. Inequalities in the 
distribution of endowments among the agents competing in the technology market leads to a 
situation where the most efficient solution in this market is for only a few SMEs to have access to 
technology while the majority are excluded. This is why the institutional structure should identify 
the various types of agents and technologies with a view to modifying existing endowments, 
striking a new balance in the market and favouring the access of SMEs to technology. 
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V. Institutional requirements 
The foregoing analysis clearly indicates that the market has been 
the repository of the institutional setting, which has determined the 
specific features of the type of capitalism prevailing in the region. 
Figure 1 outlines the hierarchies established within this Latin 
American brand of capitalism. As may be seen from this schematic 
depiction, market led mechanisms coordinate the main factor markets 
while also distributing access opportunities to the different agents. This 
hierarchical structure is thus the result of the above mechanisms, which 
not only account for how the factor markets function, but also 
predominate over the State’s regulatory and active policy-making 
capabilities.  
This pattern accounts for the reduction in the State’s ability to 
influence and regulate the economy. National governments are 
penalized when they do not adopt the market preferences. The 
difficulties to adopt counter-cyclical policies, positive right to improve 
worker conditions and protective actions of learning process are 
examples for the financial, labour and technology markets, 
respectively. In this context, we can refer to this Latin American style 
of capitalism as “State-as-hostage” capitalism.21  
Markets do not operate under perfect competition; they 
incorporate various types of failures in information, entitlement and 
learning. As a consequence of these conditions of imperfect 
competition, established mechanisms tend to generate increasingly  
 
                                                     
21  See also Vanberg (1988 and 1993). On the definition of hostage patterns, see Williamson 1986, Newman 1998. 
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asymmetrical powers in favour of private agents. In the financial market, the predominance of 
commercial banks over banking institutions devoted to supporting industrial development (e.g., 
public development banks) and dependence on international financial markets have reduced the 
State’s policy implementation capacity. In the labour market, because of the existence of poor social 
security systems and a weak regulatory capacity for enforcing workers’ rights, bargaining 
mechanisms work to the benefit of private firms and allow them to play a preponderant role in 
determining levels of employment and accessibility. The technology market is no exception to this 
general rule either, since local capacity for creating and diffusing knowledge is concentrated and 
determined by the parent companies operating within internationally integrated production systems 
and by the pattern of international specialization.  
 
Figure 1 
COORDINATION AND HIERARCHIES IN LATIN AMERICAN CAPITALISM 
 
Market-led capitalism 
with a structurally weak 
institutional setting 
Labour market: 
• Flexibility 
• Informality 
Financial market: 
• Concentration 
• Segmentation 
Technology market: 
• Adverse   
• Downgrading   
Weakness of State performance of 
its function of coordinating and 
regulating the economy 
 
The results of the reforms indicate that this form of coordination and hierarchy does not, at 
least by itself, produce the expected outcome. Unemployment remains high and a large part of 
society is excluded from employment in formal production activities. The countries’ financial 
markets have lapsed into the same difficulties as those experienced during the 1970s, and their 
concentration has ushered in marked power asymmetries that reduce the State’s capability to take 
policy action. In technology markets, the conditions described here suggest that the present pattern 
of production specialization –which is strongly biased in favour of industries producing little 
domestic value added– and the inhibiting effect on local R&D and engineering activities of the 
rapid expansion of internationally integrated production systems are pushing Latin American 
economies into a “trap” from which they may have difficulty escaping solely on the basis of free 
market principles. Moreover, the interaction of financial and technology markets reinforces the 
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monopoly power of large firms operating in different sectors of the economy while at the same time 
undermining the State’s ability to play an active role within the political economy of the region.22  
Viewed from this perspective, it becomes clear that access for the weaker agents has not 
improved and may actually worsen in the near future. This situation can be illustrated by an 
examination of three different markets. First, in the labour market, although the situation of women 
has improved in relative terms, their increased access has mainly taken the form of low-quality jobs. 
Entitlement failures typify this market and women, in particular, are discriminated against in most 
service activities. Second, in financial markets, the credit rationing faced by SMEs has not been 
reduced, even though some policies have improved the efficiency and transparency of resource 
allocation. Moreover, SMEs are subject to strong discrimination in terms of their entitlements and 
hence in their ability to gain access to financial resources. Third, in technology markets, the reforms 
have widened the productivity gap between large firms and SMEs. They have also exposed both 
types of enterprises to stronger international competition, whereas their access to the technology 
and innovation needed to face the competitive challenges of an open economy is still lagging 
behind.23 
Some of the institutional approaches that have been taken come into conflict the most visibly 
with the equilibrium welfare approach and the majority of the policy strategies that have been 
employed (Langlois 1986, Williamson 1975, Hall and Soskice 2001). As discussed in the first 
section, the equilibrium welfare approach assumes that the market and property rights alone will 
guarantee an efficient allocation of resources. Within this framework, the institutional setting is 
mainly considered in terms of how it may affect the role that the market plays.24  
Institutions can also, however, be viewed as an answer to the endogenous inconsistencies of 
equilibrium welfare. Moreover, the institutional setting is a complementary market component 
which incorporates the interactive process between the different agents in production, financial and 
social activities (Langlois 1986). The market economy succeeds not because the interests of some 
agents, people and firms are suppressed while others are kept out of the market, but because each of 
them can profit from it. It has become increasingly clear that the European and other industrialized 
economies have benefited from a participatory economic climate in which people's entry into the 
market is greatly facilitated by the fact that they had been provided with social opportunities and 
guaranteed entitlements through such services and mechanisms as schooling, basic health care, 
basic land reform and micro-credit. These economies have been riding on the success of 
individuals’ entry into the market. This is also demonstrated by the fact that specific legislation in 
the United States and elsewhere grant certain privileges to minorities in terms of access to the 
labour market (a specified minimum percentage of minorities in companies’ overall staff), to credit 
and financial markets (e.g., differentiated access to finance for SMEs) and to the education market 
(e.g., special education grant systems for minorities and so on).25  
                                                     
22  See also Rodrik (2000).  
23  The project financed by GTZ was mainly concerned with determining whether such reforms improved or reduced the access of 
excluded agents to three factor markets: labour, technology and finance. This project focused, in particular, on institutions and how 
they have changed following the implementation of these reforms in most Latin American countries. See Held (1999, 2000), León 
(2000, 2001) and Dini (2001). 
24  Using a different approach, the World Bank has also recognized that widespread institutional reform is required in most Latin 
American countries (World Bank, 1990 and 1993). Moreover, as pointed out by Camdessus, “too much attention is focused on how 
markets operate rather than on how they develop” (1999: 12). He also adds that "...but no historian has detailed the steps by which 
for example, the market economy was achieved in terms of government action or changing law; no historian has linked mercantilist 
with laissez-faire law to trace the chronology of legal and economic change. In this neglect, surely a major element for understanding 
of the industrial revolution has been overlooked." (Max Hartwell in Douglass C. North, "The Evolution of Efficient Markets In 
History”, Washington University, St. Louis). See also World Bank (1998). 
25  Moreover, at a more analytical level, the European liberal tradition also recognizes the need for the integration of market and non-market 
institutions: “The ordoliberals redefined the tradition of economic liberalism and in so doing helped to resuscitate it. All but universally 
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Markets and non-market institutions are the two sides of the same coin, and the links between 
them cannot be understood if the failures endogenously generated by the market are not included in 
the picture. The theory of institutions is the counterpart of intrinsic market failures which can be 
attributed mainly to imperfect information, unequal distribution of entitlements, asymmetrical paths 
in the learning process and coordination between agents and institutions located in different spheres 
of the economy.  
This perspective on the interaction between failures and markets makes it clear that a multi-
directional relationship exists between them. These linkages are embedded into the broader institutional 
framework of the political economy of each country.26 For example, an institutional perspective easily 
accommodates the idea that markets require "social and institutional constructs" which -depending on 
their rules and organizing principles- shape microbehaviours and adjustment mechanisms. The patterns 
of socio-economic systems can, in principle, be micro founded into underlying co-evolutionary 
processes. This fits in well with the views of many political economists and sociologists who consider 
the process of change in social norms, institutions and forms of collective organization to be a major 
ingredient in the development process. In the following section, each of the types of failures 
mentioned above will be examined. 
(a) Market failures 
This approach departs from a general equilibrium model, but relaxes the assumption that markets 
are perfect. Possible sources of market failure are: (i) the existence of monopolies, cartels and 
market power; (ii) externalities; (iii) collectively produced and/or consumed goods; and (iv) 
imperfect information. Even though all four types of market failures lead to less than optimal 
market results, most modern literature on financing constraints focuses on imperfect information 
(Stiglitz 1994, 1998). 
In the modern literature on finance, it is assumed that information is asymmetrically 
distributed. Information asymmetry –i.e., an unequal sharing of information between the two parties 
in a transfer (for example, applicants for a transfer may hide certain information which may make 
them ineligible for that transfer)– can lead to adverse selection or moral hazard. Adverse selection 
occurs when there is an incorrect identification of intended beneficiaries, while moral hazard 
represents a situation where information asymmetries caused by the unobservability of actions by 
beneficiaries allows them to gain more programme benefits than they would under full information. 
According to this view, because information asymmetries can potentially lead to adverse 
selection and moral hazard, credit and equity rationing is a structural feature of market economies. 
This has two important implications. The first is that if markets do not clear, they may "rest" in a 
below-optimum state, and policies can indeed help to improve welfare. A second implication is 
more important in terms of policy conclusions: if information asymmetry is a structural factor in 
markets, then some markets may never develop. Overcoming market incompleteness raises the 
problem of how institutions can be created that will “mimic” some of the market results obtained in 
general equilibrium models.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
disparaged in Europe for decades, liberalism resurfaced under their aegis. In place of the nineteenth century laissez faire version of 
liberalism, however, the ordoliberals articulated a new version in which law was a necessary companion of the market, transforming it 
from a source of social divisiveness into a tool for social integration. In this new version of liberalism, the market was necessary, but no 
sufficient. The economy needed to be imbedded in a constitutional-legal framework that would both protect it and help integrate society 
around it” (Gerber 1994). 
26  While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss that issue at any satisfactory level of detail, it is nonetheless apparent that 
multiple links exist which are only beginning to be explored. 
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(b) Entitlement failures 
There is an endogenous inconsistency in the equilibrium welfare approach that leads to 
asymmetries in access to different markets, goods and services (Sen, 1982 and 1984). At a micro 
level, discussions regarding the causes of access problems identify them with a lack of assets (land, 
credit, literacy, education, health, social connections), with low returns on these assets (low wages, 
low agricultural prices, low output prices) and with volatility in these returns (droughts, market 
recessions, fluctuations in commodity prices). Problems in relation to a lack and/or loss of assets, 
inability to obtain new assets, and low and/or volatile returns may be experienced by different 
agents in the national and international scenes.  
Thus, since assets are not distributed freely, levels of access and consumption depend on 
people's "entitlements", that is, on the bundles of goods and services over which, using their own 
means, they can establish ownership through production and/or trade (Sen 1984). Exclusion and 
lack of access are caused by a severe loss of entitlements by one or more groups of agents which 
deprives them of the opportunity to command and consume goods and services. In general, even in 
a competitive and perfect market, entitlement failures and their asymmetrical distribution among 
people and other economic agents affect accessibility. Given that the distribution of entitlements is 
determined by institutional, cultural and historical factors, efficient equilibrium results can coexist 
with exclusion.  
(c) Learning and knowledge-creation failures  
As a consequence of the above, it should be noted that use of the term "technology market" 
narrows the perceived scope of policy actions, as the technological process is not merely a set of 
blocks of human resources that can be bought and sold freely on the market. The technological 
process also involves significant factors that determine the characteristics of this market, such as the 
generation and dissemination of knowledge. The concept of knowledge is based on specific 
characteristics that differentiate it from the concept of information. These elements thus have both 
potentially public and tacit aspects: the first consisting of the available formal knowledge (which 
may be only potentially available due to the different ways of conceptualizing and therefore 
codifying knowledge), while the second is derived from the concept developed by Polanyi (1957) 
and related to “those elements of knowledge, insight, and so on that individuals have which are ill 
defined, uncodified, unpublished, which they themselves cannot fully express and which differ from 
person to person, but which may to some significant degree be shared by collaborators and 
colleagues who have a common experience.” Based on these characteristics, it is possible to draw a 
distinction between technology and information (Dosi, 1988), since “the latter spreads across firms, 
whereas the former includes ‘tacit and specific knowledge that are not and cannot be written down 
in a blueprint form and cannot, therefore, be entirely diffused either in the form of public or 
proprietary information’ (further discussion of what is known as the “appropriability issue” (Dosi 
1988, Cimoli and Dosi 1995).  
The institutional dimension is of central importance in the theory of innovation. This 
approach recognizes a bi-directional relationship between market structures and patterns of 
technological learning.27 Even at a properly micro level, the momentum associated with single learning 
trajectories is itself a largely social concept: "it points to the organizations and people committed by 
various interests to the system, to manufacturing corporations, research and development laboratories, 
investment banking houses, educational institutions and regulatory bodies" (Misa 1991: p. 15). And, in 
                                                     
27  Indeed, what the review by Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) demonstrates is that the perception of a potential market is a necessary 
condition for innovation, but not a sufficient one (Dosi, 1984). 
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turn, these interests and institutions are sustained by the increasing-return and local nature of most 
learning activities. Even more so, at a system level, the evolutionary interpretation presented here is 
consistent, and indeed complementary, with institutional approaches building on the observation that 
markets do not exist or operate apart from the rules and institutions that establish them and that "the 
institutional structure of the economy creates a distinct pattern of constraints and incentives", which 
defines the interests of the actors as well as shaping and channelling their behaviours (Zysman 1994: pp. 
1-2). 
Metcalfe (1995) provides a policy-oriented definition of national innovation systems (NISs) 
that incorporates the above ideas: a “set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually 
contributes to the development and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the 
framework within which governments form and implement policies to influence the innovation 
process”. He argues that both the division of labour and the peculiarities of information, which lead 
to a predominance of coordination by non-market means, fundamentally shape the nature of each 
NIS. The institutions that compose these systems (private firms, universities and other educational 
institutions, public research labs, private consultancies, professional societies, industrial research 
associations) “make complementary contributions but they differ significantly with respect to 
motivation and to a commitment to dissemination of the knowledge they create”. 
(d) Coordination synergies 
Two or more institutions are complementary if they reinforce the efficiency (or the presence) 
of each other (Hall and Soskice 2001). The institutional requirements for SMEs are a clear example 
of such complementarity. Accessibility for SMEs can be viewed as a problem of information 
asymmetry and scale. Information is an asset whose absence or insufficiency results in a non-
optimal capacity to determine what elements are required in order to adopt or adapt new 
technologies. Differences in scale are a factor because only firms that have reached a threshold 
scale and have already incorporated a certain amount of knowledge are capable of paying the 
transaction costs involved in gaining access to State subsidies.  
Accessibility can also be regarded as being a problem of entitlements. An asymmetrical 
distribution of endowments that penalizes SMEs can be viewed as the reason for the difficulties 
they have in gaining access to the financial market and paying market interest rates. The same can 
be observed in the case of labour market, where SMEs cannot afford to hire members of the skilled 
labour force or to pay the cost of training staff.  
Finally, the weakness of existing linkages with organizations engaged in the promotion of 
technological change and the diffusion of knowledge can be viewed as a result of failures in the 
learning process. Institutions that provide access to SMEs, on the one hand, and those that support 
learning capabilities, on the other, could mutually reinforce their efficiency through coordinated 
action.  
The institutional requirements of the labour market are another example. Employment can be 
promoted more efficiently if financial institutions and resources are focused on those activities that 
maintain and increase the demand for labour. Consider, for example, the role that development 
banks can play in supporting production and innovation. Employment in higher-productivity sectors 
can rise if people are able to increase their entitlements in such areas as education, services and 
social security. At the same time, the above interactions can be efficiently coordinated if learning 
capabilities and the diffusion of knowledge are actively supported.  
In cases where coordination is not promoted and diffused across different markets, some 
models of capitalism can reproduce serious inefficiencies, while models that encourage 
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coordination can increase the efficiency of the economic system as a whole and reduce the degree 
of exclusion. The State has an important role to play here (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
 
Figure 2 
COORDINATION AND COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
 
State role in promoting 
institutional 
complementarity and 
coordination synergies 
Market mechanisms  
Market failures 
(information asymmetries) 
Entitlement failures 
Learning and knowledge- 
creation failures 
 
As indicated in the above figure, these three types of failures are an intrinsic part of market 
behaviours and explain why institutions play a crucial role in improving the functioning of markets 
and market access. Appropriate policies to mitigate all three of these types of failures are often 
required in order to improve performance and increase access for vulnerable sectors and agents.  
 

CEPAL - SERIE Informes y estudios especiales No 11 
 47 
VI. Concluding remarks and  
policy implications 
In this paper we have discussed the wide variety of approaches 
(and differences of opinion) reflected in the current debate on the 
question of how a market economy functions and what role policies 
should play. In the post-reform era, Latin American policy makers 
appear to be faced with a number of dilemmas that mirror these 
divergent analytical schools of thought. While a sense of disappointment 
with the current results of those reforms seems to be almost universal, 
the question of what path the Latin American countries should now take 
is still under discussion. In this section, we will attempt to present a 
policy roadmap based on the institutional requirements for improving 
coordination and performance which have been identified. 
The economic reforms introduced during the 1990s were aimed at 
enhancing market flexibility and scaling back the State’s participation and 
intervention in the economy. In the labour market, it was assumed that 
greater flexibility was a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
achievement of a higher rate of employment and a better distribution of 
opportunities among agents. In the financial market, the aim of most Latin 
American policy makers was to eliminate the constraints that prevented 
supply and demand from being brought into equilibrium. Accordingly, 
they felt that an unregulated interest rate would guarantee SMEs a greater 
role in the market. Within this context, a similar policy conclusion has 
been espoused in relation to the technology market. According to this 
view, market signals provide the incentives that furnish an accurate 
indication of the “true” marginal costs and benefits associated with the 
production and dissemination of knowledge. 
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In general, the State’s role in the economy has in fact been reduced, and greater flexibility has 
been obtained in most markets. However, many of the targets of these reforms have been not achieved. 
Evidence of these shortcomings is found in weak growth trends, higher levels of unemployment, the 
expansion of the informal sector and a deterioration in local technological capabilities. The need to 
increase the access of weaker agents is an as yet unresolved problem which may, moreover, grow 
worse in the near future. The picture that emerges is of a Latin American model of capitalism whose 
hierarchical organization is based on the predominance of market mechanisms, a low State profile and 
the weakness of non-market institutions. The associated weakness of the non-market institutional 
structure permits the spread and persistence of various sorts of failures, such as imperfect information, 
loss of entitlements and an inability to incorporate knowledge locally. Moreover, at the meso and 
macro levels, failures may be associated with the structural absence of coordination among what could 
and should be complementary institutions.  
At a general level, the State has to put an end to the “hostage” situation that it faces today and 
assume a more active role in the political economy of the region. Its goals have to be reoriented 
towards supporting and redesigning institutions and enhancing their complementarity. The analysis 
presented in this paper clearly illustrates the weaknesses of the policies that have been implemented in 
an attempt to solve the three types of failures discussed here (see table 5). They require specific type 
of institutions, norms and rules. In the case of market failure, institutional policy should be oriented 
to promote access and diffuse information trough different type of agents, sectors and regions. In 
the case of entitlement failures, specific norms should be dedicated to guarantee the opportunity of 
the weaker agents to access to different goods and services in the labour, financial and technology 
markets. The same could be said for the learning failures. In this case, state intervention and new 
incentive has to be put in place to guarantee the well functioning of innovation systems at the sector 
and regional level.  
Table 5 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Institutional 
requirements for: 
Sources Weaknesses of Latin 
American capitalism 
Policy actions 
Market failures Imperfect information, 
predominance of 
monopolies, asymmetry in 
market power  
Reduction of the State’s role in 
the political economy and 
increasing presence of 
monopoly power 
 
Penalization of weak agents in 
different markets: informal 
workers, unemployed, young 
people, domestic firms and 
SMEs  
Promotion of access and 
diffusion of information 
 
Normative regulation that 
mitigate the power 
asymmetries in favour of the 
private sector 
Entitlement failures Lack of assets in such 
areas as education, health, 
credit, social connections 
Loss of financial, educational 
and knowledge endowments 
required in order to access 
labour, financial and technology 
markets  
Policy actions and measures 
to guarantee access for the 
weaker agents in the three 
markets  
Learning and 
knowledge-creation 
failures 
Lack of capability to 
incorporate and diffuse 
knowledge 
Difficulties of creating domestic 
knowledge and weak linkages 
between firms and institutions 
Support of national 
innovation systems 
Coordination synergies Lack of mechanisms for 
reinforcing complementarity 
between institutions in 
different markets 
Difficulties of coordinating 
institutions and policies  
 
Increasing difficulties 
encountered by the State in 
enlarging its field of action  
State action in supporting 
policy stability and 
institutional coordination  
 
 
In the case of the labour market, while both a reduction of entitlement failures and the 
provision of greater opportunities to increase learning capabilities are important objectives, a 
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modification of those factors that block attempts to increase the employment elasticity of output has 
to be considered as a necessary condition. This calls for policies to encourage improvements in the 
pattern of specialization, a reduction in the heterogeneity of the production structure and the 
continued development of the domestic market. A reduction in entitlement failures translates into 
increased opportunities to command and consume educational and other social services. Enhancing 
complementarity with other financial and technological policies is also an objective, however. 
This critical assessment clearly differs from the perspective that guided the reforms, which 
emphasized the effects of "financial repression" on the availability of savings and on the efficiency 
of resource allocation.28 The project findings suggest that the steps that will need to be taken in 
order to resolve the problem of insufficient access to finance go beyond the traditional 
recommendations of financial liberalization. There appears to be ample scope for policies to 
enhance the role of private institutions and markets in order to broaden the range of sources of non-
inflationary financing for productive investment, especially if the current trend towards the growth 
of institutional investors is maintained in the future. In order to assess possible options for long-
term market-enhancing policies in this case, further analysis will be required of the problems 
involved in financing productive investment in a developing market economy. In this connection, 
the potential role of development banks clearly has to be brought back into the debate. 
In all the countries covered by the project papers mentioned above, there is compelling 
evidence that financial liberalization and opening per se did not lead to greater access for SMEs, 
since the private financial sector did not increase financing for this sector. Instead, as mentioned 
earlier, in cases where access has been expanded, this has been accomplished by reforming and 
enhancing the role of existing specialized public financial institutions. It is also clear that policy 
action has been required in order to provide greater access for the poor to house financing. The 
Chilean case, where the government has been successfully promoting mortgage-based securities 
markets since the early 1990s, indicates that policies of market enhancement can complement 
directed credit policies aimed at increasing poor sectors’ access to house financing. Even in Chile, 
however, this market is still limited to middle- and upper-income sectors. 
This analysis of institutional trajectories points up a clear need for an innovation system 
capable of enhancing the density of the cooperation networks linking research centres, bridging 
institutions, technological institutions and firms. It can be readily observed that isolated projects, 
such as those typically undertaken in the past, are seldom successful because an innovation system 
requires systemic support. The need for coordinated promotion instruments is also discernible 
within institutions that promote industrial development. Such instruments should also be in keeping 
with regional settings and capable of forming intermediate structures. Hence the importance of 
providing sufficient economic resources, training and publicity to create institutional networks, 
since this would allow firms to enhance their problem-solving abilities, as well as endowing 
research centres with greater leverage. Up to now, the State has played a central role, even during 
this last stage, in the promotion of production, but other social actors need to become involved 
(entrepreneurial associations, bridging institutions, research centres and regional technical 
consultancies) in order to overcome the tendency towards atomization. Efforts to more in the 
direction of more integrated systems that would provide means of rapidly addressing the 
technological and organizational problems encountered by business firms are also called for. 
 
                                                     
28  For an analysis of this conventional view, see Studart (1995-6). 
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